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Abstract - With the increasing number of mobile and 
wireless networks that are deployed, the handovers 
between these systems take place more often. In order to 
provide end-users with uninterrupted access to services, 
support for fast handover is essential. One of the pre-
requisites of a fast-handover is transparent end-user 
authentication. In this paper we address end-user 
authentication at network level. We focus on providing 
transparent end-user authentication across UMTS and 
WLAN network technologies.  The end-user should be 
unaware of the underlying network technologies when it 
comes to authentication. We describe two solutions. For 
the first solution, authentication is based on the 
authentication mechanism of the UMTS network. This 
authentication relies on the shared secret between the 
UMTS SIM (USIM) card and the end-user’s home 
network. The authentication in the second case is based on 
multiple authentication mechanisms; it overcomes the 
issue of authentication differences in UTMS and WLAN 
networks. 
Keywords: UMTS, WLAN, Authentication, USIM, PEAP. 
I. INTRODUCTION 
The next generation of wireless networks will adopt an 
architecture that combines different networks in order to obtain 
wider area of coverage, higher data throughput, and better 
frequency reuse. While the wide coverage of technologies such 
as UMTS provides the end-user with always-on capability, 
technologies such as WLAN can provide hotspot data services 
as well as voice services at higher rates than UMTS. This will 
encourage end-users to connect to WLAN whenever possible 
to access their high bandwidth services.   
The small coverage of WLAN makes handovers happen 
frequently for mobile users. These handovers can be either 
between WLANs or between WLAN and other access 
technologies, e.g. UMTS. In order for the end-users to achieve 
uninterrupted network access to services, fast-handover support 
is essential. One of the pre-requisites of fast-handover is 
transparent end-user authentication. The authentication 
mechanisms that are currently used in UMTS and WLAN are 
different. These mechanisms are developed separately, and 
were not designed to interoperate. 
 In this paper we describe the solutions that enable 
transparent end-user authentication across different wireless 
access technologies; the benefit of transparent authentication is 
seamless roaming experience for the end-user. We will start by 
providing a brief summary of the authentication mechanisms of 
UMTS and WLAN in Section II. Section III describes the two 
solutions we propose to provide transparent end-user 
authentication. A short analysis of solutions will be provided in 
Section IV. Experiences from implementation of one of the 
solutions are described in Section V. Finally, the conclusions 
and directions for future work are presented in Section VI.  
II. UMTS AND WLAN AUTHENTICATION MECHANISMS  
This section provides a brief summary of the authentication 
mechanisms that are used in both UMTS and WLAN networks.  
The UMTS security mechanisms (including authentication) 
are specified by the 3rd Generation Partnership Project (3GPP) 
[1]. They are based on three principles [2]: 
• 3G security will build on the security of second 
generation systems 
• 3G security will improve the security of second 
generation systems 
• 3G security will offer new security features and will 
secure new services offered by 3G 
Authentication and Key Agreement (AKA) is an important 
feature of the UMTS system. Authentication of the end-user in 
UMTS [3] is performed in a similar way as authentication in 
GSM [4] and both GSM AKA and UMTS AKA are based on 
challenge-response mechanism. The main difference is that 
UMTS AKA enables mutual authentication: end-user towards 
the network, as well as authentication of the network towards 
the end-user.  
In short, the authentication flow is as follows [3]: 
• A master key is shared between the end-user’s UMTS 
SIM (USIM) and the home network. 
• The Visiting Location Register (VLR) or Serving 
GPRS Support Node (SGSN) authenticates the 
terminal by sending an authentication request to the 
Home Location Register (HLR) that answers with a set 
of authentication vectors.  
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• The VLR/SGSN sends an authentication request: 
including a randomly generated number (RAND) and 
AUTH to the terminal.  
• The terminal authenticates the network from the 
request generated by the network using its own key.  
• The terminal sends the response to the VLR/SGSN. 
The VLR/SGSN is then able to compare user response 
RES with the expected response XRES (thus 
authenticating the terminal to the network) 
The master key is never transmitted and the end-user has no 
knowledge of it. At the same time during the mutual 
authentication, keys for encryption and integrity checking are 
derived.  
On the other hand, in enterprise WLAN environments, 
authentication is commonly realized by a statically configured 
access list of allowed Medium Access Control (MAC) 
addresses, combined with static Wired Equivalent Privacy 
(WEP) key that is only distributed to employees. The 
shortcomings of WEP are analyzed in more detail in [5]. For 
the public environment another authentication method for 
WLAN is available: Universal Access Method (UAM) which 
is described in de-facto standard [6]. Upon accessing a public 
WLAN an end-user is presented a web page where he or she 
must enter a username (including the provider’s domain) and a 
password before being allowed to use the Internet. This de-
facto standard again does not address end-user privacy, and 
prevents seamless roaming by requiring user interaction. UAM 
or web-based authentication in general does seem to become 
the most widely deployed authentication method for the 
coming period, until better alternatives are adopted. 
In addition, there exists a feasible security solution for 
WLAN networks, based on a standard security framework 
defined by IEEE 802.1x [7]. This framework supports dynamic 
WEP keys, ensuring a sufficiently secure encryption to protect 
the privacy of mobile users. In addition, through the Extensible 
Authentication Protocol (EAP) [8] IEEE 802.1x supports 
various methods to authenticate the end-user (or his device) for 
use in a WLAN. The EAP Message Digest (MD) variant that 
uses a username and password (EAP-MD5 [8]) prevents 
seamless roaming, unless the end-user has predefined username 
and password. A more secure solution (EAP Transport Level 
Security, EAP-TLS) is based on a digital certificate containing 
the user’s credentials [9]. The certificate can be installed on the 
device or on a smart card or token.  
Protected Extensible Authentication Protocol (PEAP) [10] 
is a new member of the family of EAP protocols. PEAP uses 
TLS to create an encrypted channel between an authenticating 
PEAP client and a PEAP authenticator, such as an 
Authentication Service (AS) or Remote Authentication Dial-In 
User Service (RADIUS) server. PEAP does not specify an 
authentication method, but provides additional security for 
other EAP authentication protocols.  
To enhance both the EAP protocols and network security, 
PEAP provides:  
• Protection for the EAP method negotiation that occurs 
between client and server through a TLS channel.  
• Wireless clients with the ability to authenticate the AS. 
Because the server also authenticates the client, mutual 
authentication occurs.  
• Protection against the deployment of an unauthorized 
wireless access point (AP) when the EAP client 
authenticates the certificate provided by the AS server. 
In addition, the TLS master secret created by the PEAP 
authenticator and client is not shared with the access 
point. Because of this, the access point cannot decrypt 
the messages protected by PEAP.  
• PEAP fast reconnects, which reduces the delay in time 
between an authentication request by a client and the 
response by the server, and allows wireless clients to 
move between access points without repeated requests 
for authentication. PEAP offers fast re-authentication 
capability that supports efficient roaming between 
access points in WLAN. 
III. AUTHENTICATION SOLUTIONS IN HETEROGENEOUS 
NETWORKS 
This section introduces two authentication solutions for 
UMTS networks and WLANs. One solution is based on the 
USIM and the other solution provides a way to integrate 
different authentication mechanisms in UMTS and WLAN. For 
both solutions, we first provide the assumptions, followed by 
the authentication procedure. A comparison of the two 
solutions is given in section IV. We assume the end-user’s 
mobile terminal (MT) has dual or multiple access network 
interfaces that enable the terminal to access heterogeneous 
networks. There is a mechanism in the MT to decide which 
access network to attach to. In both solutions, the MT supports 
mobile IP (MIP). MIP is required to enable seamless roaming 
on IP level. 
A. UMTS SIM (USIM) based solution 
This solution is based on the authentication mechanism of 
the UMTS network. A generic solution using a USIM 
authentication mechanism in both UMTS networks and an IP 
based network can be found in [11]. Our solution described 
here is tailored to an architecture that consists of IEEE 802.11 
based WLANs and UMTS networks.  
1) Assumptions 
 
• The UMTS network and WLANs use the same 
authentication server (AS) located in the UMTS 
network. Each AS has digital certificate issued by a 
Certificate Authority (CA). The CAs can be different 
for the authentication servers in different UMTS 
networks.  
• The MT is always connected to the UMTS network.  
• The MT needs to obtain the public key of the serving 
AS if it wants to switch to the WLANs affiliated to it. 
The key can be passed to the MT by the UMTS 
network during a mutual authentication, either with the 
home network or with the visiting network.  
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• The WLANs are located within the range of UMTS 
networks they are affiliated with, which assures that a 
MT has the public key to validate the AS of a WLAN. 
• The MT supports the PEAP, including our USIM 
extension. 
2) Authentication procedure 
 
For this solution we have developed a new PEAP based 
authentication method: PEAP-USIM. The reasons to choose 
PEAP instead of EAP are the additional security features as 
described in Section II. 
The validation of the AS is done through the validation of 
its digital certificate. The authentication of the MT is done 
through the P-TMSI and CK which are carried on the USIM.  
 
Figure 1.  The PEAP--USIM based solution 
The mutual authentication procedure to a WLAN is as 
follows (see also Figure 1): 
a) The AS sends a PEAP/Start packet, which is an EAP-
Request packet with EAP-Type=PEAP, the Start (S) 
bit set, and no data. The initial clear text identity 
exchange is omitted to protect the identification of the 
end-user from disclosure. The AP acts as a proxy and 
Network Access Server (NAS) between the MT and 
the AS.                                                                                                                           
b) The MT sends an EAP response packet with EAP-
Type=PEAP. The data filed of the packet contains the 
information needed to setup a TLS link.  
c) The AS sends its certificate to the MT while setting up 
the TLS secure link. The MT validates the certificate 
using the public key it received from the UMTS 
network during its association with current UMTS 
network. If the authentication succeeds, the procedure 
continues, as the secure link has been set up. 
d) The MT and AS negotiate and agree to use PEAP-
USIM authentication method. 
e) The AS sends a RAND to the MT. The MT processes 
the challenge using the CK in its USIM and sends the 
result to the AS.  
f) The AS verifies the MT by looking up the P-TMSI list 
and finds the CK in the VLR of the end-user. It then 
carries out the same calculation as the MT did using 
the RAND and CK and compares the results. 
(According to the assumptions, hotspots deployed by 
service provider A are within the range of UMTS 
networks of service provide A, the AS need only to 
check the data in its local VLR.  
g) If the authentication succeeds, the AS sends an 
authentication success message to AP, which will 
enable its controlled port for the MT’s MAC address 
and enables  a WEP key. 
h) The MT obtains a new local IP address which will be 
used in the WLAN. The new local IP address will be 
registered at home agent. 
Because of the “always-on” service in UMTS network, the 
end-user can quickly switch back to the UMTS network. The 
MT only needs to register the local IP address assigned by the 
UMTS network at the home agent. It does not need to 
authenticate itself again to the UTMS network. 
For the WLANs owned by enterprises or individuals that 
have their own authentication mechanism, the authentication 
method can be negotiated after the TLS channel has been set 
and they need not to support this PEAP-USIM method. 
B. Solution using multiple authentication mechanisms 
 
In this solution the UTMS networks and WLANs use 
different authentication mechanisms. Authentication in UMTS 
network is based on USIM. Authentication in WLANs is based 
on digital certificates. The authentication mechanisms for 
WLAN such as 802.1x and EAP-TLS support mutual 
authentication between MT and AS. The AS has Internet 
access during the EAP authentication; it is capable of following 
a certificate chain to verify a peer’s identity. However, the MT 
does not have a connection to the Internet before the 
authentication succeeds. As the MT stays offline, in order to 
validate the certificate of an AS, the MT needs to hold public 
keys of different CAs, as well as the certificate revocation list 
(CRL) of each CA. This may be difficult for the MT, which has 
limited storage space. As the number of CA grows and when 
there is a certificate chain the situation becomes worse. The 
solution relies on the always-on ability enabled by the UMTS 
network. It means we can use the UMTS link to access to the 
Internet and validate the certificate of an AS when necessary. 
1) Assumptions 
 
• The UMTS networks and WLANs are managed by 
different operators. They use different authentication 
servers. 
• The UMTS and WLAN network operators have 
established roaming agreements. The MTs are always 
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connected to the UMTS network because of its wide 
coverage. 
• Every MT and each WLAN AS have a digital 
certificate issued by a CA. The CAs that issue the 
certificates can be different. The digital certificates are 
used during mutual authentication.  
• The WLANs lie within the coverage of a UMTS 
network. 
• MT supports PEAP with our proposed extension. 
2) Authentication procedure 
 
The authentication of a WLAN is based on PEAP, where 
the certificate of MT could be sent before the TLS secure 
connection is set up so that the AS can authenticate the MT. 
However, in order to protect end-user identity from being sent 
in clear text, this is not done. The MT certificate is only sent 
after the TLS connect has been setup. For this solution, we 
define a new PEAP based authentication method: PEAP – 
Certificate.  
 
Figure 2.  Solution using multiple authentication mechanisms 
When a MT needs to switch from a UMTS network to a 
WLAN, the authentication begins and the procedure is 
described below (see also Figure 2): 
a) The AS sends a PEAP/Start packet, which is an EAP-
Request packet with EAP-Type=PEAP, the Start (S) 
bit set, and no data. The initial clear text identity 
exchange is omitted to protect the identification of the 
end-user from disclosure. The AP acts as a proxy and 
NAS.  
b) The MT sends an EAP response packet with EAP-
Type=PEAP.  
c) AS sends the certificate to the MT while setting up the 
TLS secure link. The mobile terminal validates the 
authentication server. Through the UMTS Internet 
connection, it is capable of following a certificate chain 
or verifying whether the certificate has been revoked. 
d) MT sends an EAP response to set up the TLS link. The 
MT’s digital certificate is not sent in this message. 
e) After the TLS link has been set up, the AS and MT 
negotiate to use PEAP-Certificate method. The MT 
then sends its certificate to the AS. Because AS is on 
the Internet, it can always connect to the CA to validate 
the certificate of the MT. 
f) If the authentication succeeds, the AS sends a 
authentication success message to AP, which will 
enable its controlled port for the MT’s MAC address. 
g) The MT obtains a new local IP address that will be 
used in the WLAN. The new local IP address will be 
registered with the home agent. 
Because of the “always-on” service in UMTS network, the 
end-user can quickly switch back to the UMTS network. The 
MT only needs to register the local IP address assigned by the 
UMTS network at the home agent, and does not need to 
authenticate itself again to the UTMS network. 
IV. COMPARISON OF THE SOLUTION 
The first solution, based on the UMTS authentication 
mechanism, is especially useful when the UMTS network 
operator wants to deploy WLANs as an augment to the cellular 
network. The network operator can reuse the existing 
infrastructure for authentication. Roaming users can easily be 
allowed to use WLANs that are affiliated to visited UMTS 
networks, based on roaming agreements. The end-user 
information is transferred from the home network to the visited 
network during the authentication of normal UMTS terminals. 
The end-user can switch to the WLANs relatively fast, since 
the secure association is always done locally. The disadvantage 
of this solution is that the WLANs must lie within the range of 
the UMTS network they are affiliated with. Otherwise, the end-
user won’t acquire the public key to validate the authentication 
server.  
The second solution, based on multiple authentication 
mechanisms, is more applicable when different network 
operators deploy UMTS and WLAN networks, possibly using 
different authentication mechanisms.  Currently, the number of 
WLAN hotspots is increasing, providing Internet access in 
public places, such as bars, hotels and train stations. The 
solution we propose can easily integrate the existing and 
emerging wireless network technology, such as UMTS and 
WLAN. Our solution requires minor extensions of the existing 
authentication protocols. However, some additional software at 
the mobile terminal is required. Every mobile terminal should 
also possess a digital certificate. Although server certificates 
are common today, the usage of client certificates is not yet 
widely adopted.  
V. IMPLEMENTATION 
The second solution has been validated as part of the 
4GPLUS project [12]. The research in the 4GPLUS project is 
focused on the development of a service platform for beyond 
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3G environments. The service platform hides the complexity 
and the heterogeneity of the underlying networks to both the 
end-user and the service provider. The service platform 
provides mobility management across different types of access 
networks, therefore providing a seamless roaming experience 
to the end-user. This includes the provisioning of transparent 
end-user authentication. 
Reference [13] provides a high-level overview of the 
integrated security architecture we applied within 4GPLUS 
project. Due to the absence of operational UMTS networks, 
GPRS – for which the authentication mechanisms are 
comparable to UMTS – is used. The service platform acts as an 
authentication server that takes care of the authentication for 
different network domains. The service platform can integrate 
the different authentication mechanisms used within the 
different domains and can provide the end-user with one 
subscription for all these networks. For the GPRS network, 
SIM based authentication is used. When the end-user roams to 
WLAN, this is detected by the mobile terminal, the end-user is 
authenticated and the network interfaces are re-configured 
without any service interruption or end-user involvement. The 
current implementation illustrates how a loosely coupled 
approach can be used to provide transparent end-user 
authentication across networks that are using different 
authentication mechanisms 
VI. CONCLUSIONS AND FUTURE WORK 
In this paper, we have described two solutions to provide 
transparent end-user authentication across heterogeneous 
wireless networks, in particular UMTS and WLAN. The first 
solution is based on the authentication mechanisms of the 
UMTS network. This solution is very suitable for operators 
who want to deploy WLAN as an augment to their UMTS 
networks. It applies the authentication mechanism used in the 
UMTS network to WLAN technology. Using a security 
mechanism in another environment than it initially has been 
designed for, usually introduces security vulnerabilities.  
Further research is required to identify these vulnerabilities by 
performing a detailed risk analysis and a detailed analysis of 
the security mechanisms. 
The second solution is based upon multiple authentication 
mechanisms. This solution is aimed at the situation where 
different service providers deploy UMTS and WLAN 
networks. Both solutions are based on the PEAP protocol 
specification of the IETF.  
The beyond 3G environment not only consists of UMTS 
and WLAN networks; it contains more subsystems, such as 
satellite networks, wireless local loops and so on. Future study 
on transparent end-user authentication can be extended to these 
subsystems.  
In addition, service providers in the future can provide full 
coverage and seamless connection to the end-users, by 
establishing agreements with other access network operators. 
End-users can then select the best networks available to them. 
An interesting research topic is to see how profile information 
can be used to do this automatically.  
ACKNOWLEDGMENTS 
We would like to thank Gerard Hoekstra, Ko Lagerberg 
and Harold Teunissen from Bell Labs Advanced Technologies 
EMEA for their contribution to this paper. 
Elements of the work described in this paper are part of the 
research project called 4GPLUS [12]. This project is supported 
in part by the Dutch Freeband Impulse Program on 
Telecommunication Applications (http://www.freeband.nl/) 
and is co-funded by the Dutch Ministry of Economic Affairs. 
REFERENCES 
[1] 3rd Generation Partnership Project, http://www.3gpp.org. 
[2] 3GPP Technical Specification “TS 33.120, Security Principles and 
Objectives”, March 2001. 
[3] 3GPP Technical Specification “TS 33.203, Access Security for IP-based 
Services”, June 2003. 
[4] 3GPP Technical Specification "TS 03.20 V8.1.0, Security related network 
functions", October 2000. 
[5] Nikita Borisov, Ian Goldberg, David Wagner, “Security of the WEP 
Algorithm”, http://www.isaac.cs.berkeley.edu/isaac/wep-faq.html. 
[6] Wi-Fi Alliance, “Best Current Practices for Wireless Internet Service 
Provider (WISP) Roaming”, version 1.0, 
http://www.wifialliance.org/opensection/downloads/WISPr_V1.0.pdf, 
February 2003. 
[7] IEEE 802.1x “Port Based Network Access Control”, 
http://www.ieee802.org/1/pages/802.1x.html, June 2001.  
[8] IETF, RFC 2284, “PPP Extensible Authentication Protocol (EAP)”, 
http://www.ietf.org/rfc/rfc2284.txt, March 1998. 
[9] IETF, RFC 2716, “PPP EAP TLS Authentication Protocol”, 
http://www.ietf.org/rfc/rfc2716.txt, October 1999. 
[10] IETF, Internet Draft, “Protected EAP Protocol”, 
http://www.ietf.org/internet-drafts/draft-josefsson-pppext-eap-tls-eap-
06.txt, March 2003. 
[11] Juha Salvela, “Access Security in Third Generation Mobile Networks’, 
Proceedings of the Helsinki University of Technology Seminar on 
Network Security, fall 2000. 
[12] 4GPLUS Project, 4th Generation Platform Launching Ubiquitous 
Services,  http://4gplus.freeband.nl.  
[13] Jeroen van Bemmel, Harold Teunissen, Gerard Hoekstra, “Security 
Aspects of 4G Services”,  published at Wireless World Research Forum  




0-7803-7954-3/03/$17.00 ©2003 IEEE. 2092
